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Despite the recent successes of transformer-
based models in terms of effectiveness on a
variety of tasks, their decisions often remain
opaque to humans. Explanations are partic-
ularly important for tasks like offensive lan-
guage or toxicity detection on social media be-
cause a manual appeal process is often in place
to dispute automatically flagged content. In
this work, we propose a technique to improve
the interpretability of these models, based on
a simple and powerful assumption: a post is
at least as toxic as its most toxic span. We
incorporate this assumption into transformer
models by scoring a post based on the maxi-
mum toxicity of its spans and augmenting the
training process to identify correct spans. We
find this approach effective and can produce
explanations that exceed the quality of those
provided by Logistic Regression analysis (of-
ten regarded as a highly-interpretable model),
according to a human study.
1 Introduction
The rapidly increasing usage of social media has
made communication easier but also has enabled
users to spread questionable content (Matamoros-
Fernández, 2017), which sometimes even leads to
real-world crimes (Johnson et al., 2019; Committee
et al., 2017; Center, 2017). To prevent this type of
speech from jeopardizing others’ ability to express
themselves in online communities, many platforms
prohibit content that is considered abusive, hate
speech, or more generally, toxic. To enforce such
policies, some platforms employ automatic con-
tent moderation, which uses machine learning tech-
niques to detect and flag violating content (Djuric
et al., 2015; Nobata et al., 2016; MacAvaney et al.,
2019).
Leveraging the development of pre-trained lan-
guage models (Devlin et al., 2019; Liu et al., 2019b)
and domain transfer learning (Gururangan et al.,
2020; Sotudeh et al., 2020), many models (Wiede-
mann et al., 2020) achieved high performance on
toxicity detection (Zampieri et al., 2020). However,
directly deploying such systems could be problem-
atic for the following reasons. Despite being highly
effective, one major problem is that the decisions
of the systems are largely opaque, i.e., it can be
difficult to reason why the model made its deci-
sion (Waseem and Hovy, 2016). This interpretabil-
ity problem is especially apparent when compared
to prior models, such as Logistic Regression, that
transparently assign scores to each input feature
(here, words) that can be used to justify the model’s
decision. Knowing how one decision is made is im-
portant in toxicity detection. On one hand, recent
laws such as General Data Protection Regulation1
highlighted the significance of interpretable models
for users; on the other hand, interpretable models
can assist online community moderators in reduc-
ing their time spent on checking each potentially
problematic post. Since the purpose of these ex-
planations is for human consumption, we consider
a model to be interpretable if it can produce a set
of words from the input text that humans would
consider a reasonable justification for the model’s
decision.
In this work, we propose a technique to im-
prove the interpretability of transformer-based mod-
els like BERT (Devlin et al., 2019) and ELEC-
TRA (Clark et al., 2020) for the task of toxicity
detection in social media posts. We base our tech-
nique on a simple and powerful assumption: A post
is at least as toxic as its most toxic span. In other
words, the toxicity of a piece of text should be asso-
ciated with the most toxic span identified in the text.
To this end, we propose using neural multi-task
model that is trained on (1) toxicity detection over
1https://gdpr-info.eu/
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(a) When the input sequence is toxic, the toxicity of the most
toxic span is picked to represent the toxicity of the sentence.
(b) When the input sequence is not toxic, none of the spans are
toxic, and thus the whole sequence is predicted as non-toxic.
Figure 1: Illustration of our proposed approach. We showcase applying our proposed approach to the transformer-
based model, BERT, in this case. In the linear layer, darker color denotes a more toxic span.
the entire piece of text and (2) toxic span detection
(i.e., identifying individual tokens in the text that
are toxic). Rather than the typical transformer clas-
sification approach, our model predicts the toxicity
of each individual term in the text and aggregates
them via max pooling to predict the toxicity of the
entire text (see Fig. 1). Through experiments on
the Civil Comment Dataset (Borkan et al., 2019),
we find our proposed approach not only improves
the classification effectiveness compared to models
that are only trained on the classification task, but
also helps when transferring the model to a similar
task. More importantly, however, the structure of
our model inherently generates explanations of the
decision by selecting the terms with the highest
toxicity scores. We find through a human study
that these explanations exceed the quality of those
provided by Logistic Regression—a model often
regarded as highly interpretable. An error analysis
has shown multiple insights into utilizing contextu-
alized models in toxicity detection and lead future
directions.
2 Related Work
Due to the ubiquity of online conversations, the
need for automatic online toxicity detection has be-
come crucial to promote healthy online discussions.
Early research relied on surface-level features, e.g.,
bag-of-words approaches (Warner and Hirschberg,
2012; Waseem and Hovy, 2016; Davidson et al.,
2017), and traditional machine learning methods.
Although reported to be highly predictive (Schmidt
and Wiegand, 2017) and easily interpretable, they
suffer from the problem of false positives as the
presence of certain patterns could lead to misclas-
sification (Kwok and Wang, 2013). For example,
some slurs that frequently appear in African Amer-
ican English are usually picked as strong evidence
of toxicity (Xia et al., 2020); these words are in-
deed innocuous and only confined within the black
online community. These features also require such
predictive terms to appear in both training and test-
ing set to work effectively. Later on, neural textual
representations have shown effectiveness in toxic-
ity detection. Djuric et al. (2015) proposed using
sentence-level embedding (Le and Mikolov, 2014)
to represent the textual information and has shown
great improvement against average over word-level
embedding (Nobata et al., 2016). These representa-
tions are usually utilized together with either linear
classifiers such as Logistic Regression (Djuric et al.,
2015), or neural classifiers such as Convolutional
Neural Networks (CNN) (Gambäck and Sikdar,
2017) and Long Short-Term Memory Networks
(LSTM) (Badjatiya et al., 2017). More recently,
large-scale pre-trained language models such as
Bidirectional Encoder Representation from Trans-
former (BERT) (Devlin et al., 2019) have shown
great advantages in toxicity detection (Zampieri
et al., 2019b, 2020), by learning contextual word
embeddings instead of static embeddings.
Despite the fact that systems can achieve aston-
ishing performance on given datasets, they suffer
from the problem of lacking interpretability. One
way of providing interpretability is to explain pre-
dictions (Belinkov and Glass, 2019). For textual
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data, such explanations could be those sub-strings
(i.e., spans) that significantly influence the models’
judgments, which were named rationales in Zaidan
et al. (2007). Zhang et al. (2016) proposed a CNN
model that exploits document labels and associ-
ated rationales for text classification. On toxicity
detection, while most of the works were done fo-
cusing on improving the model performances, less
attention was paid to interpretability. SemEval-
2021 Task 5 provided the Toxic Spans Detection
Dataset (TSDD)2 where each sample is annotated
with both post-level label and rationales. Mathew
et al. (2020) also provided a hate speech dataset
where samples are annotated with rationales and
other labels; though they also provided baseline
models that can incorporate rationales, these mod-
els were built to evaluate the effectiveness of their
proposed dataset, and thus cannot be easily trans-
ferred to other settings.
3 Model
We propose a neural multi-task model that can pre-
dict the toxicity and explain its prediction at the
same time by providing a set of words that can jus-
tify its prediction. In this section, we introduce the
assumption that empowers our model with inter-
pretability. Then we present the proposed model’s
architecture and the multi-task training paradigm.
3.1 Assumption
We begin with the following assumption: A post is
at least as toxic as its most toxic span. This assump-
tion suggests that if there is a word or phrase in a
piece of text that is toxic, i.e., with a level of toxic-
ity that is over a certain threshold, the toxicity level
of the entire text is certainly over such threshold,
and, therefore, should be considered toxic.
This assumption can be formalized as follows.
Let x = {x1, x2, ..., xn} denote the input sequence
where n is the length of the sequence. Given the
input x, we can define y as the toxicity label for the
sequence and y as the toxicity labels for individual
token. Let s = {s1, s2, ..., sn} be a model’s predic-
tion of toxicity for each token. By our assumption,
we apply a max pooling operation over s:
s̃ = max(s) (1)




We acknowledge that this assumption may not al-
ways hold. In some cases, toxicity can be expressed
in subtle or implicit ways, such as through sarcasm
or metaphor (MacAvaney et al., 2019; Waseem
et al., 2017). In such cases, there is often not a
clearly identifiable span that is toxic. However,
these cases are difficult for any model to identify,
and through our experimental results in Section 5,
we find that this does not hinder the effectiveness
of our model.
3.2 Architecture & Methodology
To detect the toxicity and learn the toxic spans at
the same time, we propose to use a neural multi-
task learning framework (Caruana, 1997). In our
settings, we jointly train the model with two re-
lated tasks: (1) Toxicity Detection (at the sequence
level), and (2) Toxic Span Detection (at the to-
ken level). These two tasks share all the parame-
ters in the model. Our approach can be applied to
any sequence encoder model (e.g., LSTM or trans-
former). Given the input sequence x, let the output
of the sequence encoder be H = {h1,h2, ...,hn},
H ∈ Rn×d. Here hi ∈ Rd denotes the i-th hidden
state of the final layer, where d denotes the length
of the hidden embedding. Unlike what Devlin et al.
(2019) do for sequence classification where the lin-
ear layer is only stacked on the [CLS] token, we
place it on top of the whole output sequence H.
Let W ∈ Rd×1 denote the parameters of the linear
layer, then we have:
s = H ·W (2)
For the classification task, we use s̃ as the predicted
toxicity where s̃ is calculated following the proce-
dure mentioned in Eq. (1). For the span detection
task, we directly leverage the output toxicity se-
quence s. This setup ensures that the model learns
to predict the text as toxic if a span is toxic.
For the purposes of training, letD1 be the dataset
for toxicity detection task, and D2 be the dataset
for toxic spans detection task. We construct the




LC(x, y)︸ ︷︷ ︸





Loss for toxic spans detection
(3)
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where LC is the loss for the toxicity detection task
and LS is the loss for the toxic spans detection task.
λ denotes a hyperparameter specifying the weight
for each task. Here the toxicity detection task is
a sequence classification task and the toxic spans
detection task is a token classification task. We
jointly train the model across tasks in an end-to-
end fashion, minimizing the Mean Square Error
(MSE) loss for both tasks.
4 Experiments
We conduct experiments to answer the following
research questions:
RQ1 Does our aforementioned assumption affect
the model’s performance at detecting toxic
content?
RQ2 Is our approach applicable to different trans-
former models?
RQ3 Does our approach produce models that can
generalize to different domains?
RQ4 Does our model identify spans that improve
the interpretability of model decisions?
4.1 Data
We primarily train and evaluate our system us-
ing the Civil Comment Dataset (CCD) (Borkan
et al., 2019). For interpretability, we leverage the
Toxic Spans Detection Dataset (TSDD)2 in a multi-
task training paradigm. We also use the Offensive
Language Identification Dataset (OLID) (Zampieri
et al., 2019a) for the cross-domain evaluation.
CCD The CCD (Borkan et al., 2019) is a large-
scale dataset with crowd-sourced post-level annota-
tions for toxicity, provided by the Civil Comment
platform.3 Posts that are rude, disrespectful, or
unreasonable (Borkan et al., 2019) are considered
toxic based on the rating guidelines as published by
the Perspective API (Nithum et al., 2017; Wulczyn
et al., 2017). Through the platform, crowd-sourced
raters were asked to rate comments as “Very Toxic”,
“Toxic”, “Hard to say”, or “Not Toxic”. A toxicity
score between zero and one of a post is the fraction
of raters considering it to be toxic. We further cast
the scores to binary labels by setting a threshold
of 0.5 (i.e., at least half of the raters consider the
3The platform was shut down by the end of 2017:
https://medium.com/@aja_15265/saying-
goodbye-to-civil-comments-41859d3a2b1d
post toxic). The dataset contains around 1.8 million
posts in total, and 8% of them are labeled as toxic.
TSDD TSDD2 is a 10,000-sample subset of
CCD, containing only toxic comments, marked
up with individual spans that are toxic. Each post
is annotated by three annotators. 528 posts have
no annotated span since the annotators believe they
are toxic as a whole without any explicit span.
OLID We use the OLID offensive language
dataset (Zampieri et al., 2019b) to examine the
domain-transferability. This dataset contains web
posts with hierarchical annotation (Waseem et al.,
2017). We use its first layer, where the annotations
indicate whether the content is offensive (32%) or
non-offensive (67%). For our evaluation, we use
the official 860-sample OLID test set.
Curated CCD For the purpose of training and
evaluation, we constructed a 30,000-sample cu-
rated CCD by mixing the clear-cut examples with
the ambiguous ones, showcased in Table 1. Here,
14,000 samples are used for training and the rest
are for testing.
We first sampled 7,000 highly toxic posts (tox-
icity score greater than 0.8) and 7,000 non-toxic
posts (toxicity score less than 0.1) from CCD. Note
that 3,000 of the toxic posts sampled were drawn
from TSDD, which is still a subset of CDD, for the
span annotations. These posts are considered to be
easy since a great portion of the raters agreed on
the judgment.
We further sampled another 8,000 ambiguous
posts that have toxicity scores between 0.1 and
0.3 and contain terms that frequently appear in the
toxic posts. Terms annotated at least 20 times as
part of toxic spans in TSDD are considered fre-
quent, resulting in a list of 62. The top 20 terms are
presented in Table 2. We believe that these toxic
terms are used in a non-toxic way in these posts,
and, therefore, are good adversarial examples for
the models to learn from the context instead of
memorizing the frequent terms. To maintain an
even proportion of toxic and non-toxic posts, we
sample an additional 8,000 highly toxic posts.
4.2 Implementation
Here, we describe the implementation details of
our baselines and the proposed models.
LR We use Logistic Regression (LR) classi-
fier with lemmatized uni-gram and bi-gram fea-
tures and L2 regularization as our baseline for both
effectiveness evaluation and interpretability eval-
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Comment Toxicity Label
Like me flagging your comments. 0 Non-toxic
We need to tax the clueless, irresponsible idiots . 0.898 Toxic
Don’t take the bait of the troll . It’s what they want. 0.167 Non-toxic
Table 1: Three samples from Curated CCD. We highlight the toxic spans in the toxic sample with purple underline .
We mark the potentially toxic words in the non-toxic sample with pink double underline .
Word Freq. ↓ Word Freq. ↓
stupid 1085 idiotic 119
idiot 572 ridiculous 103
idiots 378 ass 102
ignorant 270 fools 100
stupidity 253 damn 100
dumb 185 racist 97
moron 163 loser 91
fool 163 morons 88
pathetic 145 hypocrite 65
crap 127 shit 62
Table 2: The 20 most frequent entries of the toxic word
list for finding ambiguous non-toxic samples in CCD.
uation. LR is shown to be effective in toxicity
detection (Djuric et al., 2015; Waseem and Hovy,
2016) while naturally providing explanations for its
predictions if utilized together with bag-of-tokens
features. While there are other models that rely
on the attention mechanisms to provide various in-
terpretability (Rogers et al., 2020), we choose to
use LR instead of them. On the one hand, they
usually need postprocessing to perform interpre-
tation, which is less straightforward and intuitive
compared to LR; on the other hand, there are still
debates about whether attention mechanisms can
produce meaningful explanations (Wiegreffe and
Pinter, 2019; Jain and Wallace, 2019). For our
LR baseline, NLTK is used for preprocessing and
scikit-learn is used for building the classifi-
cation model.
For the following transformer-based models, we
utilize the transformers (Wolf et al., 2020)
library with Adam (Kingma and Ba, 2015) op-
timizer. The learning rate is by default set to
2 × 10−5 and the number of training epochs is
tuned on the validation set. We also utilized the
pre-trained BERT-base (Devlin et al., 2019) and
ELECTRA-base (Clark et al., 2020) that are avail-
able in the Huggingface community. Input sen-
tences are trimmed to a max length of 256 tokens.
BERT/ELECTRA-CLS As baselines, we eval-
uate typical sentence classification (CLS) architec-
tures tuned on only the post-level labels by adding
a linear layer on top of the [CLS] token. Both
BERT and ELECTRA are trained with the cross-
entropy loss, which is the default setting in the
transformers library.
BERT/ELECTRA-SP We also evaluate mod-
els that are only trained for the span detection (SP)
task. It follows the architecture and methodology
mentioned in Section 3.2, except only optimizing
the toxic spans detection loss LS . Since only a por-
tion of the samples contains toxic span annotations,
the models are only trained on that subset. Beyond
the toxic spans detection task, we also evaluate the
toxicity detection performance for these models
leveraging our proposed assumption, even though
these models are not trained for toxicity detection.
BERT/ELECTRA-MT Finally, we describe
the implementation of our proposed Multi-
Task (MT) models. The models are built with the
architecture described in Section 3.2 and optimized
with the joint loss L shown in Eq. (3). Since not
all the input posts have the labels for toxic spans,
the multi-task models are trained by interleaving
samples with and without span information. Joint
loss L is calculated for those samples with labels
for both tasks; for samples with only post-level la-
bels, we calculate only the classification loss LC .
During training, we interleave the update with each
kind of loss to ensure a balance update on the pa-
rameters. We specify the hyperparameter λ to be
0.5 (i.e., weighting both tasks equally).
5 Results on Toxicity Detection
In this section, we answer the first three research
questions by presenting and analyzing the classi-
fication effectiveness of the proposed models in
various settings.
The in-domain toxicity detection performance is
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Non-Toxic Toxic
Model P R F1 P R F1 Macro-F1
LR 0.824 0.828 0.826 0.827 0.823 0.825 0.826
BERT-CLS 0.944 0.674 0.786 0.746 0.960 0.840 0.813
ELECTRA-CLS 0.952 0.617 0.749 0.717 0.969 0.824 0.787
BERT-SP 0.843 0.771 0.806 0.789 0.857 0.822 0.814
ELECTRA-SP 0.884 0.716 0.791 0.761 0.906 0.827 0.809
BERT-MT 0.900 0.879 0.890 0.882 0.903 0.892 0.891
ELECTRA-MT 0.904 0.880 0.892 0.883 0.907 0.894 0.893
Table 3: In-domain evaluation results for toxicity classification on the Curated CCD dataset. We report Preci-
sion (P), Recall (R), and F1 for each model on all categories. We also report the Macro-F1 for all models. The best
F1 performance is indicated in bold.
shown in Table 3. Both of our proposed multi-task
models BERT-MT and ELECTRA-MT achieve the
best performance among all models we evaluated.
Models using the [CLS] tokens perform the worst
among others, even worse than the ones that are
only trained on the span detection task. This sug-
gests that the span information is capable of pre-
dicting the toxicity of the entire content and com-
bining it with the post-level supervised information
further improves the effectiveness. This answers
RQ1: our proposed model based on our assumption
improves the classification effectiveness. Further-
more, BERT-MT and ELECTRA-MT are equally
effective in respect to various evaluation metrics;
therefore, we validate RQ2: our approach general-
izes to at least two pre-trained transformer models.
Interestingly, LR has the highest precision
among the baselines but the lowest recall, suggest-
ing that the model may be relying on high-precision
features such as racial slurs. This matches previous
observations by MacAvaney et al. (2019).
In a domain transfer setting, i.e., training on
CDD and testing on OLID, our approach is com-
petitive with models trained on OLID. In Table 4,
both BERT-MT and ELECTRA-MT obtain a com-
petitive 0.77 macro-F1 without training on any ex-
ample in OLID, even outperforming some lead-
ing systems reported on this dataset. Therefore,
we confirm that our models remain effective in a
domain-transfer setting (RQ3).
5.1 Error Analysis
To better understand the limitations of our proposed
models, we qualitatively analyze the predictions
against the gold labels using BERT-MT.
False Positives One major source of false posi-
tives comes from treating negative words, usually
Model Macro-F1
SVM (Zampieri et al., 2019a) 0.69
BiLSTM (Zampieri et al., 2019a) 0.75
BERT-FT (Liu et al., 2019a) 0.83
BERT-MT (ours, transfer) 0.77
ELECTRA-MT (ours, transfer) 0.77
Table 4: Evaluation on the OLID. BERT-FT stands for
the BERT model fine-tuned on the OLID data. Our sys-
tem performs competitive in a completely transfer set-
ting (only trained on CCD data). We report Macro-F1
for all models here. The best performance is in bold.
adjectives, such as disgusting, lazy, incompetent, as
strong signals for toxicity. Also, our proposed mod-
els tend to treat certain sub-words that frequently
appear in toxic contexts as toxic spans. For exam-
ple, the sub-word ##nt of magnificient is predicted
as toxic (0.9794) in the following sentence:
Should have had the magnificient Doug
Ford stump for Smith....LOL
This could be attributed to its high frequency in
explicitly toxic words such as ignorant and arro-
gant.
We also suspect that the model is over-leveraging
expression patterns or co-occurrences for toxicity
classification. For example:
I have never seen a suspect identified as
a “brown” man.
Here, the model misclassifies it as toxic and
picks the word brown as the most toxic span with
a toxicity score of 0.527. We first rule out the pos-
sibility that the toxicity comes from the negation
4Toxicity score.
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by experimentally removing the word never from
the sentence. We find that the toxicity score of the
sentence increases to 0.762 with the word brown
still as the most toxic span. We then examine by
replacing the word suspect and keep the rest; when
we replace suspect with girl or mom, the toxicity
score for brown decreases to 0.334 and 0.141 re-
spectively; when changing to prisoner or scammer,
the toxicity score for word brown becomes 0.717
and 0.972. Among all the cases that we have exper-
imented with, the word brown is consistently the
most toxic word in the sentence. It seems that the
model is learning the correlation between the noun
suspect (or any other word positioned here) and
the adjective brown. Though it might lead to false
positives in rare cases, the predictive power that
enables this phenomenon could potentially be the
reason that our model is doing better in picking un-
seen words as toxic spans than the LR model since
it infers the prediction without leveraging on the
lexical information but the syntactic information.
False Negatives Some comments are inherently
hard for both human and machine classifiers to
identify. There are cases where the sentences can
reasonably be considered as non-toxic where our
model is also predicting as such. For example:
Ignore the trolls Sheema......You are
great and I always enjoy your pieces.
LOL....I keep hearing Garland never
got a hearing blah,blah,blah....It sucks
being in the minority....Go win some
elections..
When the headline reads ”Steve
Bannon’s porn and meth house”
In the first and second example, the speaker is not
intended to be toxic even with the appearance of
the word trolls and sucks. For the third example,
the toxicity lies in the quoted text, which is also
not the intention of the speaker. It is debatable that
whether our model is indeed making mistakes on
these naturally ambiguous comments.
Another major source of false negatives comes
from the unawareness of the outside context, e.g.,
the target of the comment. For example:
Degenerate comment.
I’m beginning to think the left lacks the
mental capacity to reason.
Model SD-P SD-R SD-F1
LR 0.111 0.195 0.120
BERT-SP 0.836 0.798 0.792
ELECTRA-SP 0.840 0.807 0.798
BERT-MT 0.837 0.785 0.784
ELECTRA-MT 0.842 0.788 0.789
Table 5: Evaluation results on toxic spans detection
task. The best performance is bolded.
These words/phrases such as degenerate, and lacks
the mental capacity to, which could also be utilized
in the neutral descriptions, are used here for ex-
pressing toxicity. It is easy for a human to reason
out the target mentioned in the sentence and thus
be aware of the toxicity raised; this is usually not
the case for machine classifiers.
Also, many users intentionally modify the explic-
itly toxic words (e.g., replacing or removing char-
acters) to obfuscate automatic detection while still
keeping their intent clear to human (Djuric et al.,
2015), e.g., changing word idiots into I.d.i.o.t.s or
modifying word asshole to a-hole. Even for ad-
vanced transformer models, they still need to learn
deeper information or be incorporated with more
human supervision to be fully aware of these cases.
6 Interpretability
Finally, we examine the interpretability of our mod-
els. We first leverage the existing span annotations
to evaluate but discovered that they limit our analy-
sis. To overcome the limitation, we further conduct
a user study to evaluate the interpretability directly.
6.1 Span Detection as Interpretation
We select a balanced 8,000-sample set from the test
split of the Curated CCD. Here, non-toxic posts
have toxicities between 0 and 0.1 and therefore are
all considered to have no toxic spans; toxic samples
are all from TSDD. We follow the ad-hoc evalua-
tion metrics which are introduced in Da San Mar-
tino et al. (2019) and utilized in SemEval 2021
Task 52 – Span Detection Precision (SD-P), Re-
call (SD-R), and F1 (SD-F1). Due to the nature
of the toxicity span detection task where instances
span from single tokens to multiple sentences, the
ad-hoc evaluation metrics give partial credits to
imperfect matches at the character level. Given a
post t, let the ground truth be a set of character
offsets StG and let one certain system Ai return a
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set of character offsets StAi . With the system Ai
and ground truth, the SD-P and SP-R on post t are






With SD-P and SD-R defined, the SD-F1 is also
defined:
F t1 =
2 · P t ·Rt
P t +Rt
(5)
We report the average values over all samples.
The evaluation results are shown in Table 5.
Models trained for the span detection task (*-
SP) achieve the highest F1 scores with no surprise.
However, our multi-task models provide nearly
equal span detection effectiveness with far better
performance on toxicity detection (See Table 3).
Also, BERT-MT and ELECTRA-MT perform simi-
larly here, further confirming that our approach can
be used in various transformer models (RQ2).
We also compared with LR, which is widely
considered to be interpretable. The predicted span
from the LR model is reconstructed from the bag-
of-token features. Features that contribute to the
positive score for the sample are considered as the
interpretation of the model. Our proposed models
were shown to strongly outperform LR by a large
margin. Note that LR’s performance is hindered in
this evaluation, as it was not trained for sequence
classification (e.g., what CRF would do), despite
being considered an interpretable model.
6.2 User Study
The labeled toxic spans used for the evaluation
in Section 6.1 are not annotated to be the interpre-
tation for the toxicity of the post. We argue that it
is not sufficient to evaluate the interpretability of
prediction along with other known issues in auto-
mated evaluation (Manning et al., 2020; Novikova
et al., 2017).
Therefore, we select 400 toxic samples from
the test split of Curated CCD and 237 offensive
samples from the testing set of OLID for the inter-
pretability study. For each sample, three words
with the highest predicted score from the mod-
els are picked as the explanation and are post-
processed to the same form to avoid identifying
the models based on the types of token prepro-
cessing. Annotators are asked to annotate for the
toxicity (e.g., whether the sample is toxic) of the
samples and pick the model with a better explana-
tion. The order and the name of the models are
hidden from the annotators to avoid biases. Al-
though ELECTRA-MT and BERT-MT perform
comparably in terms of F1, we found that quali-
tatively BERT-MT is better and therefore picked
for the user study.
Despite the subjectivity of the annotation task,
the annotators agreed in 78% of the cases. For our
quantitative analysis, we use the samples that the
annotators agree on. We also filter out 22 samples
that both of the annotators considered non-toxic.
Preference CCD OLID All
LR 26.5% 18.8% 24.0%
BERT-MT 59.4% 41.6% 53.7%
No Preference 14.2% 39.6% 22.3%
Table 6: Aggregated human preference during the inter-
pretability experiment for CCD and OLID. We see that
the annotators prefer the explanations from the BERT-
MT over those from LR by a hefty margin.
On average, our annotators prefer BERT-MT
over LR on more than half of the samples. As
shown in Table 6, BERT-MT is considered to be
more interpretable in both datasets by a wide mar-
gin. This result not only suggests that our proposed
assumption provides interpretability to transformer
models (RQ4) but also better explanations than the
widely-known interpretable models.
We now take a closer look at how BERT-MT
model’s explanations compare to those from LR.
Some examples are shown in Table 7. We find that
the predictions from BERT-MT are more polarized,
while those from LR tend to be neutral. This is
because the usage of MSE loss in BERT-MT penal-
izes values for not being close to 0 or 1; for LR, the
L2 regularization penalizes large weight values. It
is also worth noting that these models differ in how
term scores are aggregated over the post; BERT-
MT takes the maximum, whereas LR takes the sum.
For analysis, we highlight three cases here:
When BERT-MT is preferred. BERT-MT can
pick out the toxic spans more accurately by lever-
aging the context. In comparison, the LR model
suffers from picking words based on frequency
even with a non-toxic usage, resulting in a bias to-
ward some entities, such as certain groups of people
(See example A in Table 7). BERT-MT also takes




BERT-MT red ##neck followers are doing all they can to make america white again .
LR redneck follower are doing all they can to make america white again .
B
BERT-MT not only is he a liar , he ’ s a coward too ! the clown is going down !
LR not only is he a liar , he ’ s a coward too ! the clown is going down !
C
BERT-MT wow you ’ re un - smart .
LR wow you ’ re un-smart .
D
BERT-MT your constant ability at being an a - hole liar doesn ’ t make you great
LR your constant ability at being an a-hole liar doe n’t make you great
Table 7: Examples for qualitative analysis on interpretability. Here red color indicates toxicity, blue color
indicates innocuousness, and white color represents neutral. Darker colors indicate more polarity.
tains the toxic word pieces when users are altering
words to avoid censorship; while LR lemmatizes
the tokens and resulting in losing this information.
When LR is preferred. We observe that LR
tends to predict more spans than BERT-MT, leading
to higher recall, resulting in more comprehensive
explanations. Take the example B in Table 7 for
instance, the LR is able to pick out the word coward
and clown which are considered to be non-toxic by
BERT-MT. We conclude that BERT-MT is more
cautious in predicting words as toxic.
When both models are equal. We find that
both models are doing poorly if the sentence is
implicitly toxic. Such indirect toxicity is car-
ried either by negation (Example C in Table 7)
or adversarially-modified toxic words (Example
D in Table 7). Finally, there are also many cases
where both models are doing equally well. This
category of samples is generally easier to detect
with explicit terms or slurs without ambiguity.
7 Conclusion & Future Work
In this paper, we proposed a toxicity detection ap-
proach that builds in the interpretability by pre-
dicting the toxicity of a piece of text based on
the toxicity level of its spans. We showed that
our approach is more effective in both in-domain
and cross-domain evaluation than baselines that
were shown to be effective. By conducting a user
study, we further showed that our approach gen-
erates better explanations of the classification de-
cisions than what Logistic Regression produces,
which is known to be interpretable.
In the future, we plan to extend our current work
in several ways. We plan to take the implicit tox-
icity into consideration to make our assumption
more robust. Besides, we will dig more into toxic-
ity detection with long sequences. We also plan to
investigate methods that consider more subtle con-
text and actors in the content to better distinguish
different usages of the toxic terms.
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